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Fool Me Twice:
Zubik v. Burwell and the Perils of Judicial 
Faith in Government Claims
Mark L. Rienzi*
It is tempting to think of Zubik v. Burwell as a case that fizzled. 
After all, the latest version of the contraceptive mandate fight was 
initially viewed as one of the term’s biggest blockbusters. The case 
generated widespread public interest and involved a particularly 
large expenditure of legal resources by the Court and the parties. 
There were dozens of parties, two classes, four years of litigation, 
seven petitions for certiorari, expanded merits briefing, a supple-
mental round of merits briefing, extended oral argument, and more 
than 70 amicus briefs. On one side stood the consciences of groups 
like the Little Sisters of the Poor and on the other stood expanded 
access to birth control. The button could hardly be hotter.
Yet after all of that attention and effort, Zubik came to a surprisingly 
short and seemingly inconclusive result: a three-page per curiam 
opinion remanding the cases for further consideration. Because the 
Court’s opinion did not resolve the merits of the case, many called it a 
“punt” or a “dodge.”1 Viewed in that light, Zubik looks like Macbeth’s 
view of life: full of sound and fury, but ultimately signifying nothing.
* Associate professor, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
senior counsel, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The author was counsel to 
 several of the plaintiff organizations whose cases came to the Supreme Court in 
Zubik v. Burwell, and to the religious plaintiffs in three prior Supreme Court cases 
concerning the contraceptive mandate: Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 
Denver, Colorado v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (mem.); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); and Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 
(2014) (mem.).
1  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, Seeking Compromise, Return Contraceptive Case to 
Lower Courts, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/us/
supreme-court-contraception-religious-groups.html (“President Obama, in a Buzzfeed 
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But viewing Zubik that way is a mistake. The Supreme Court liti-
gation in Zubik generated three important government concessions 
showing a surprising truth at the heart of the seeming conflict: that 
it is possible to protect both contraceptive access and religious liberty. 
Based on those concessions, the Supreme Court was able to reach 
unanimity in a case that was once predicted to generate deadlock. 
Far from dodging the issues, the Court’s opinion worked significant 
changes in the relationships between the parties, in that it vacated 
important precedents in at least eight different circuits, and forbade 
the government from making religious organizations comply with 
the contraceptive mandate or pay large fines.
At a time when perceived conflicts between health care access and 
religious liberty are on the rise, the government’s 11th-hour conces-
sions in Zubik provide important evidence that even seemingly in-
tractable conflicts are often resolvable. Simply put, there are many 
other ways to provide broad contraceptive access without enlisting 
the Little Sisters of the Poor and other religious groups. The path to 
resolution that developed in the Supreme Court will thus make Zubik 
a model for other disputes about health care and religious liberty.
But Zubik is not just a model for future cases; it is also a warning. 
When the justices requested supplemental briefing and proposed 
solutions for the parties to discuss, commentators noted that the 
Court was acting out of character, more like a trial judge or mediator.2 
And while the Supreme Court’s adoption of those uncharacteristic 
interview, said the opinion was notable for what it said about the state of the Supreme 
Court. ‘I won’t speculate as to why they punted,’ he said, ‘but my suspicion is that if 
we had nine Supreme Court justices instead of eight, there might have been a different 
outcome.’”); S.M., The Supreme Court Dodges a Decision on Contraceptive Coverage, 
Economist, May 28, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/ 
2016/05/prophylactic-move (calling Zubik “one of this year’s most closely watched 
cases” which ultimately “fizzled to a close”).
2  See, e.g., Charles F. Webber & Jane Dall Wilson, Zubik v. Burwell: The Supreme 
Court as Mediator, Law360, June 1, 2016, http://www.law360.com/articles/801585/
zubik-v-burwell-the-supreme-court-as-mediator (“The real story in Zubik is that the 
court acted in the role of a mediator, not as a court seeking to resolve a concrete le-
gal dispute presented to it. The court actively sought a middle ground, appeared to 
find one that both parties could live with, then sent the case back to the lower courts 
with instructions to ‘allow the parties sufficient time to resolve any outstanding is-
sues between them.’ This Supreme-Court-as-mediator is extremely unusual—if not 
unprecedented.”).
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roles proved successful, it is important to understand why the Court 
was forced to act like a trial judge or mediator four years into the 
dispute, and why the government’s position changed so dramatically 
at the Supreme Court.
The answer is simple, but deeply troubling: lower courts were far 
too trusting of the government’s claims. Rather than forcing the gov-
ernment to carry its statutory burdens, many lower courts gave the 
government the benefit of the doubt and presumed that the govern-
ment’s descriptions of its programs and alternative options were ac-
curate. As a result of that deference, the government was not forced 
in the lower courts to explain exactly how its contraceptive mandate 
system worked or to acknowledge the existence of adequate alterna-
tives. Instead, those important developments happened quite late, in 
merits briefing at the Supreme Court.
Three important consequences flowed from the lower courts’ 
undue deference to the government. First, judicial resources were 
wasted. The Supreme Court was forced to do work that could and 
should have been accomplished years earlier in lower courts across 
the country. Had the government’s arguments been greeted sooner 
with skepticism rather than deference, the entire issue and dozens 
of cases might have been resolved years ago. Second, many lower 
courts were drawn into clear misstatements about how the contra-
ceptive mandate operates and whether the government has alterna-
tives. Now that the government has abandoned the arguments with 
which it breezed through those courts, it has left many judges look-
ing somewhat credulous for having accepted claims the government 
would not even try at the Supreme Court. Excessive deference thus 
undermines the credibility of the courts, particularly those that most 
emphatically embraced positions the government itself would rather 
jettison than defend at the Supreme Court. Third, by trusting the 
government, those courts turned civil-rights laws relating to religion 
on their head. Those laws are designed to be deferential to religious 
believers about what their faith requires of them, but to apply the 
highest level of judicial skepticism—strict scrutiny—to the govern-
ment’s arguments. The lower courts in Zubik got it exactly back-
wards: skepticism toward the religious believer and almost blind 
faith in the government’s claims.
Zubik then offers a crucially important lesson for litigants and 
lower court judges about the dangers of deference to the government 
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in civil-liberties cases. Religious-liberty laws—like many civil-rights 
laws—are built on the premise that majoritarian governments will 
sometimes undervalue the rights of minorities. Both the Constitution 
and federal civil-rights laws require Article III courts not to defer to 
governments in those circumstances. This is especially true in hot-
button cases, in which the political pressure on government to sacri-
fice minority religious practices to achieve a popular majoritarian goal 
will be greatest. Instead, it is the responsibility of the lower courts to 
do exactly what the Supreme Court eventually did in Zubik—pressure 
the government to explain itself and prove its case. As in Zubik, this 
pressure will often reveal that win-win solutions are available, despite 
the government’s initial protestations to the contrary. Failing to apply 
such pressure will waste judicial resources, expose judges to embar-
rassment for embracing positions the government later admits were 
false, and frustrate the proper functioning of civil-rights laws.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the three gov-
ernment concessions that made the Supreme Court’s Zubik decision 
possible and how those concessions ultimately revealed that it is 
possible to protect both contraceptive access and religious liberty. 
Part II discusses how the circuit courts were brought to emphatically 
adopt positions the government would ultimately abandon under 
the slightest pressure. Part III concludes with some key lessons lower 
courts should take from Zubik to better protect the integrity of both 
the court system and religious-liberty laws.
I.  Zubik’s Surprise: Three Government Concessions Point to 
Win-Win Solutions to What Seemed Like an Intractable Conflict
When the sudden death of Justice Antonin Scalia left the Court 
with just eight members, some commentators concluded that Zubik 
would be a case in which neither the parties nor the justices could 
find agreement.3 After all, Zubik was only the latest chapter in a long-
running dispute over the federal government’s contraceptive man-
date. That dispute had generated dozens of lawsuits and had already 
sharply divided the Court in previous terms.
3  See, e.g., Joan Frawley Desmond, What Will Justice Scalia’s Death Mean for the 
Little Sisters of the Poor?, Nat’l Cath. Reg., Feb. 18, 2016, http://www.ncregister.com/
daily-news/what-will-justice-scalias-death-mean-for-the-little-sisters-of-the-poor.
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The contraceptive mandate dispute arises from a provision in the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which was enacted in 2010. The ACA 
requires certain employer-provided health benefits to include “pre-
ventive care” for women.4 A subagency within the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS)—the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA)—was tasked by Congress with 
defining “preventive care” and, on its website, defined that term to 
include female sterilization and all FDA-approved female contracep-
tives.5 Beginning in 2011, HHS in turn issued a series of regulations 
dictating how various employers must comply with the contracep-
tive coverage requirement.6
For a small minority of employers, however, religious beliefs pre-
vent them from being able to assist the government’s efforts to expand 
contraceptive access. These employers view some or all contracep-
tives as religiously forbidden and, therefore, would be violating their 
religion if they provided employees with a health plan that included 
contraceptives. Accordingly, they asserted claims under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), arguing that the government was 
impermissibly burdening their religion without a sufficient reason.7
A. Prior Decisions Suggested Zubik Could Be Deadlocked
By the time the issue was before the Court in Zubik, the justices had 
already considered similar religious-liberty claims arising from the 
contraceptive mandate four times.8 Each time, the Court had acted to 
protect religious people and organizations from forced compliance 
with the mandate. But the Court’s actions had revealed divisions 
among the justices.
4  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
5  See Health Resources and Services Administration, Women’s Preventive Service 
Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines.
6  See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 46621 (Aug. 3, 2011).
7  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1173–95 (10th 
Cir. 2015). The plaintiffs in these cases also asserted a variety of other claims, challeng-
ing the mandate on, inter alia, First Amendment, Administrative Procedure Act, and 
other grounds. See, e.g., id. at 1195.
8  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 
1022 (2014) (mem.); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014); 
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (mem.); Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2924 (2015) (mem.).
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The Court first addressed the mandate in ruling on an emergency 
application from the Little Sisters of the Poor. For many religious 
nonprofits, the mandate was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 
2014, triggering a wave of lawsuits and decisions in the fall of 2013. 
Although most nonprofits had received injunctions in the lower 
courts, the Little Sisters of the Poor were denied an injunction from 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on December 31.9 
With millions of dollars in fines set to accrue on January 1 if they did 
not sign the government’s form, the Little Sisters filed the legal ver-
sion of a Hail Mary: an emergency All Writs Act application for an 
injunction pending appeal from the Supreme Court. The application 
was filed with Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the circuit justice respon-
sible for the Tenth Circuit.
Late on New Year’s Eve—while she was en route to Times Square 
to assist with the ceremonial dropping of the ball to ring in the New 
Year—Justice Sotomayor issued an injunction protecting the Little 
Sisters from the mandate and ordering the government to file a re-
sponsive brief.10 The Little Sisters had argued that the form the gov-
ernment wanted them to sign would authorize the use of their plan 
to distribute contraceptives.11 The government responded that the 
form would not cause the flow of contraceptives and really was just 
needed “to provide for regularized, orderly means of permitting eli-
gible individuals or entities to declare that they intend to take advan-
tage”12 of the “accommodation.” The government even insisted that 
forcing the Little Sisters to sign the form was the “least restrictive 
means” of furthering its interests.13
The government’s position was bizarre. If the form did not 
help contraceptives flow, why did the government insist on it? 
And why would the government fight so hard—all the way to the 
9  Order Denying Plaintiff-Appellants’ Emergency Motion for an Injunction, Little 
Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13-1540).
10  Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2013) (mem.).
11  Emergency Application for Injunction Pending Appellate Review at 8–10, Little 
Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014).
12  Memorandum for Respondents in Opposition at 33, Little Sisters of the Poor v. 
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13A691).
13  Opposition to the Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, Little Sisters 
of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13-6827).
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Supreme Court, against the Little Sisters of the Poor, of all people—to 
get them to sign it? If the government simply needed to know they ob-
jected, it would not use the threat of millions of dollars in fines to get 
the nuns to execute a particular document. The government’s regu-
latory and litigation behavior simply didn’t match its claim that the 
form was meaningless.14
Three weeks later, the justices called the government’s bluff. They 
gave the Little Sisters the injunction they had asked for. But they also 
gave the government what they had said they wanted—a way to 
know the nuns objected. As a condition of the injunction, the Court 
required the Little Sisters to tell HHS that they “are non-profit organi-
zations that hold themselves out as religious and have religious objec-
tions to providing coverage for contraceptive services.”15 The ruling 
was clear, though, that the government could not insist on making 
the nuns sign the prescribed form: “applicants need not use the form 
prescribed by the Government and need not send copies to third-
party administrators [TPA].” The decision issued without dissent.
A few months later, the Court appeared much more divided in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. There, it had determined by a 
5–4 vote that the contraceptive mandate could not be applied against 
a religious family-owned business. In particular, the Court held that 
forcing the religious plaintiffs to provide health benefits that include 
emergency contraceptives constitutes a substantial burden on their 
religion, and that the government had not established that such a re-
quirement was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling 
government interest.
The Court explained that even if it assumed the existence of a 
compelling interest, the government had not demonstrated why “the 
most straightforward way” of achieving its interests—namely, “for 
the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contracep-
tives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them”—was not 
14  See also Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 
927, 942 (8th Cir. 2015) (“We need look no further than to the government’s own litiga-
tion behavior to gauge the importance of self-certification in the regulatory scheme. If 
TPAs had a wholly independent obligation to provide contraceptive coverage to reli-
gious objectors’ employees and plan beneficiaries, there would be no need to insist on 
the nonprofit religious organizations’ compliance with the accommodation process.”).
15  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 
1022 (2014) (mem.).
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a viable alternative. In particular, the Court suspected that the cost 
of providing those contraceptives directly “would be minor” when 
compared to the cost of the act as a whole. “If, as HHS tells us, pro-
viding all women with cost-free access to all FDA-approved methods 
of contraception is a Government interest of the highest order, it is 
hard to understand HHS’s argument that it cannot be required under 
RFRA to pay anything in order to achieve this important goal.”16
The Hobby Lobby decision could have stopped there, because once 
it was clear that HHS had not carried its burden, the government 
could not win under RFRA. But the Court went further, leaving a 
door open that would eventually result in the Zubik cases. Although 
the Court was clearly not convinced by HHS’s argument that it 
should not have to create new programs—saying “we see nothing 
in RFRA that supports this argument”—it explained that the gov-
ernment would not have to create a new program anyway. Why? 
Because “HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an 
approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund 
contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs”: the so-
called “accommodation” the government offered (at the time) only 
to religious nonprofits.17
Under the “accommodation,” the government allowed certain reli-
gious organizations to add the drugs to their health plan in an alter-
native way—essentially by submitting a government-designed form 
(EBSA Form 700) instructing their insurer or plan administrator to 
include the drugs instead. This accommodation scheme—which was 
at issue in the Little Sisters case—required the religious organization 
to execute plan documents to “ensure[] that there is a party with 
legal authority to arrange for payments for contraceptive services 
and administer claims in accordance with ERISA’s protections for 
plan . . . beneficiaries”18 and to ensure that beneficiaries receive such 
payments “for so long as [they] remain[] enrolled in the plan.”19 If 
religious organizations comply with the mandate by issuing those 
plan documents, the government said it would require the insurer 
16  All quotes in this paragraph from Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780–81 (emphasis 
in original).
17  All quotes in this paragraph from id. at 2781–82.
18  78 Fed. Reg. 39880.
19  78 Fed. Reg. 39876.
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or plan administrator to provide the drugs without charging the re-
ligious group.20
Hobby Lobby found this alternative mechanism of compliance to 
be less restrictive than what the government was then requiring of 
religious businesses. The Court made clear that it was not deciding 
whether this arrangement would satisfy RFRA as to any organiza-
tion that objected to it.21
To the extent there was any doubt about whether the Court was 
deciding the legality of this alternative mechanism, the Court elimi-
nated that doubt just three days later, when it granted Wheaton Col-
lege an emergency injunction against the “accommodation.”22 Like 
the Little Sisters of the Poor, Wheaton had sought emergency relief 
at the Supreme Court under the All Writs Act when fines were about 
to accrue. The government argued, however, that forcing Wheaton 
to execute the form and allow the use of its plan was “the least re-
strictive means” of achieving the government’s goals.23 Despite 
that claim, the Court granted Wheaton relief, generating a strongly 
worded dissent from Justices Sotomayor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and 
Elena Kagan.24
After Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College, the government modified its 
regulations to allow contraceptives to be added by sending a notification 
letter to the government. The government made clear that the notification 
letter, like Form 700, would have to be a plan instrument.25 And the gov-
ernment emphasized that the effect of this new process was exactly the 
same as the old process: it would trigger the provision of contraceptives 
20  Id.
21  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (“We do not decide today whether an approach of 
this type complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims.”).
22  The Wheaton College application itself was something of a precursor to Zubik, as 
it came from one side of a split among the courts of appeal regarding the legality of the 
mandate, particularly after Hobby Lobby. See, e.g., id. at 2807 (“The Circuit Courts have 
divided on whether to enjoin the requirement that religious nonprofit organizations 
use EBSA Form 700.”).
23  Memorandum for Respondents in Opp. at 3, Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. 
Ct. 2806 (2014) (No. 13A1284).
24  Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
25  See, e.g., sample EBSA Form 700, available at https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
preventiveserviceseligibleorganizationcertificationform.doc (“This form or a notice to 
the Secretary is an instrument under which the plan is operated.”).
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to plan beneficiaries.26 In this respect, the government showed flexibil-
ity about how the drugs were added to the employer-provided coverage; 
but there was no change regarding whether the government required the 
drugs be added. One way or the other, the government would not yield 
and religious groups would be required to comply with the contracep-
tive mandate. And the religious groups were equally steadfast in their 
position: whether the drugs were added to the plan via Form 700 or a 
letter to the government, they objected to this use of their health plans.27
Thus, the immediate aftermath of Hobby Lobby included both the 
seeds of the return trip to the Supreme Court and omens that the conflict 
would remain intractable. That conflict continued to seem intractable 
as the issue percolated in the lower courts the following year, resulting 
in one more emergency All Writs Act application being granted, setting 
the stage for another Supreme Court fight on the merits.28
B.  Government Concessions at the Supreme Court Demonstrate That 
Solutions Are Possible
Of course we now know that the conflict wasn’t nearly as intrac-
table as it once seemed. That is because the government changed its 
position at the Supreme Court on three key issues.
First, after years of claiming the opposite in the lower courts, the 
government conceded in its merits brief that contraceptive coverage 
provided under the “accommodation” actually was “part of the same 
plan as the coverage provided by the employer.”29 This concession 
severely weakened the government’s substantial burden argument, 
which in turn shifted the Supreme Court’s focus to strict scrutiny.
26  79 Fed. Reg. 51092, 51092 (Aug. 27, 2014); The Center for Consumer Informa-
tion & Insurance Oversight, Fact Sheet, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/
Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.html (current as of Sept. 8, 2014) 
(“Regardless of whether the eligible organization self-certifies in accordance with the 
July 2013 final rules, or provides notice to HHS in accordance with the August 2014 
[Interim Final Rules], the obligations of insurers and/or TPAs regarding providing or 
arranging separate payments for contraceptive services are the same.”). This fact sheet 
often changes. The version cited is on file with author.
27  Little Sisters of the Poor, Brief on Interim Final Regs. at 5, Little Sisters of the Poor v. 
Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (2015) (No. 13-1540) (“The interim final rules therefore merely offer 
the Little Sisters another way to violate their religion and comply with the Mandate.”).
28  Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924 (2015) (mem.).
29  Brief for the Respondents at 38, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-1418) 
(quotations omitted).
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Second, the government admitted for the first time in its merits 
brief that its interests actually did not require women to receive com-
plete cost-free contraceptive coverage from their employers. Instead, 
the government acknowledged that its interests would be satisfied 
so long as women had access to a plan with some contraceptive cov-
erage, which they could obtain from many sources, including “a 
family member’s employer,” “an Exchange,” or “another government 
program.” As the government told the Court, “All of these sources 
would include contraceptive coverage.”30
Third, when the Court asked for supplemental briefing on alterna-
tives, the government acknowledged that its existing system was not 
the least restrictive means of achieving its goal. Instead, after years 
of telling the lower courts that it was already using the least restric-
tive means possible, the government told the Court that the system 
actually “could be modified” to avoid forcing religious organiza-
tions to execute documents that violate their faith, while still getting 
women contraceptives.31
As set forth below, these three concessions dramatically changed 
the case, made the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion possible, 
and showed that solutions are possible that protect both contracep-
tive access and religious liberty.
Concession 1: Contraceptive coverage under the “accom-
modation” actually is part of the employer’s plan after all.
When the litigation resumed in the lower courts, the government 
was initially very successful: eight out of nine courts of appeals ul-
timately decided in its favor.32 All of those eight circuits began their 
analysis—and most ended it—by agreeing with the government’s 
30  Id. at 65.
31  Supp. Brief for the Respondents at 14–15, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) 
(No. 14-1418).
32  By the time the Supreme Court considered Zubik, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits had ruled for the government; only the 
Eighth Circuit had ruled for the religious plaintiffs, thus creating the circuit split that 
eventually caused the government to acquiesce in the request for the Court to take 
up the cases. Zubik consolidated a total of seven certiorari requests arising from four 
different circuits (Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C.); later-filed petitions from four other 
circuits were granted, vacated, and remanded in light of Zubik (Second, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eighth); and the Eleventh Circuit vacated its own decision.
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argument that the mandate did not impose a “substantial burden” 
on plaintiffs’ religion at all. The key to this reasoning was accept-
ing the government’s claim that the contraceptives provided under 
the “accommodation” were not part of the employer’s health plan 
at all, and therefore could not possibly violate the rights of the reli-
gious employers who contracted for those plans.33 Once these courts 
viewed the contraceptive coverage as separate from the religious 
organizations’ health plans, they could accept the government’s 
claim that the religious organizations were simply trying to unfairly 
control the actions of third parties and interfere with their indepen-
dent provision of contraceptives.34
The government’s claim that contraceptive coverage under the 
“accommodation” was not part of the religious organization’s health 
plan was always in tension with its insistence that the coverage must 
be “seamless” with that plan. How can coverage possibly be “seam-
less” with—but simultaneously “separate” from and “independent” 
of—the same health plan? By definition, the more “seamless” a plan 
is, the less independent and separate it is. A seamless garment is not 
a patchwork, much less two separate garments.
As described in more detail below, the circuit courts nevertheless 
accepted at face value the government’s claims that the contraceptive 
coverage was separate from the employer’s plan and based their sub-
stantial burden analysis on that view.35 But as the litigation moved 
to the Supreme Court, the inherent conflict in the government’s po-
sition began to undermine the “not your plan” argument that had 
previously been so successful.
First, in July 2015—at a time when the government was undefeated 
in the courts of appeal and may have thought it would run the table 
and avoid Supreme Court review—HHS issued revised rules finaliz-
ing the “accommodation.” In so doing, the agency needed to explain 
why other proposed solutions would not work. Commenters had 
33  Brief for the Appellees at 25, Priests for Life v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(No. 13-5368).
34  Compare id. at 22 (“Plaintiffs object to requirements imposed on third parties, not 
on themselves.”) with Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 246 (“[A]n adherent may not use a 
religious objection to dictate the conduct of the government or of third parties.”).
35  See, e.g., E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 461 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
government is requiring the insurers and third-party administrators to offer [contra-
ceptive coverage]—separately from the plans—despite the plaintiffs’ opposition.”).
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suggested many other ways that contraceptives could be provided 
to women who want them—by mail, directly from prescribing doc-
tors, from pharmaceutical companies, or through government pro-
grams like Medicaid. In response, HHS took the position that “these 
alternatives raise obstacles to seamless coverage” because “plan ben-
eficiaries and enrollees should not be required to incur additional 
costs—financial or otherwise—to receive access.” The government 
then explained that the insurers and administrators of the employer’s 
plan were actually better situated to provide “seamless” access. This 
is because any solution that operated outside the employer’s plan 
would involve providers “that may not be in the insurance cover-
age network” of the employer’s plan, and would “lack the coverage 
administration infrastructure to verify the identity of women in ac-
commodated health plans and provide formatted claims data for 
government reimbursement.”36
Once the agency had so forthrightly admitted in the Federal Regis-
ter that the accommodation system would in fact use the employer’s 
plan—using its “insurance coverage network,” its “claims administra-
tion infrastructure,” its information to “verify . . . identit[ies],” and its 
systems to “provide formatted claims data,”—the government lost its 
nerve. It could not plausibly insist to the Supreme Court that the con-
traceptive coverage would be completely separate from the employ-
er’s plan. The religious parties promptly seized on the government’s 
statements and presented them to the Supreme Court as evidence that 
the contraceptive coverage would use their health plan after all.37
As a result, the government began acknowledging in its Supreme 
Court filings that, in fact, the contraceptive coverage provided under 
the “accommodation” is part of the employer’s health plan after all. 
For example, in opposing certiorari in one case, the government ex-
plained: “If the objecting employer has a self-insured plan, the con-
traceptive coverage provided by its TPA is, as an ERISA matter, part 
of the same ERISA plan as the coverage provided by the employer.”38 In its 
merits brief in Zubik, the government likewise acknowledged that 
36  All quotes in this paragraph are from 80 Fed. Reg. 41328–29 (July 14, 2015).
37  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, 11, 21, Little Sisters of the Poor et al. v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 15-105).
38  Brief for the Respondents in Opp. at 19, E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 
449 (No. 15-35) (emphasis added). ERISA stands for the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act.
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“[a]s a result, the coverage provided by the TPA is, as a formal ERISA 
matter, part of the same ‘plan’ as the coverage provided by the employer.”39
Although the government attempted to limit this concession to 
self-insured plans, the damage had been done. Self-insured plans are 
actually the most common kind of employer health plan available.40 
And the details of what the government said would happen under 
the accommodation—using the plan’s “insurance coverage network,” 
“claims administration infrastructure,” and information to “verify . . . 
identit[ies]” and provide claims data for reimbursement—were the 
same regardless of whether an employer uses an “insurer” or “third 
party administrator.”41
Thus it was no surprise that, by the time of oral argument, the 
government’s “substantial burden” argument was in tatters. Justices 
Anthony Kennedy and Ginsburg each pointedly suggested during 
argument that the solicitor general appeared to be conceding the 
substantial burden argument entirely.42 The solicitor general told the 
Court the government would be “content” if the Court assumed a 
substantial burden and decided the strict scrutiny questions.43 Chief 
Justice John Roberts commented that he thought the government 
was trying to “hijack” the religious groups’ health plans, a concern 
echoed by Justice Kennedy.44 When pressured directly about whether 
the government was trying to force inclusion of contraceptives in 
39  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 29, at 38 (emphasis in original).
40  In fact, at around the same time this issue was playing out in the contraceptive 
cases, the government told the Supreme Court in another case that self-insured plans 
actually cover the majority of workers—nearly 60 percent of them. See Brief of the 
United States at 19, Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (No. 14-181) 
(citing Paul Fronstin, Self-Insured Health Plans: State Variation and Recent Trends by 
Firm Size, Emp. Benefit Res. Inst. Notes at 2 (Nov. 2012)).
41  80 Fed. Reg. 41328-29.
42  Transcript of Oral Arg. at 45, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14–1418) 
(JUSTICE KENNEDY: “And is it fair for me to infer from the way you open your 
remarks that you concede that there is a substantial burden here? And the question 
then is what is a permissible accommodation? What’s the least restrictive alternative? 
Do you concede that there’s a substantial burden?”); Arg. audio at 1:02, Zubik, 136 S. 
Ct. 1557 (JUSTICE GINSBURG: “So you are giving up on the substantial burden?”). 
Note that the transcript has Ginsburg asking “Now you aren’t . . .” but this is in error.
43  Transcript of Oral Arg., supra note 42, at 61.
44  Id. at 76 (“That’s why it’s necessary to hijack the plans.”).
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“the one insurance policy” offered by the employer, the solicitor gen-
eral agreed that would be a “fair understanding” of the case.45
If any doubts remained about the viability of the government’s 
once-successful substantial burden argument, they were elimi-
nated by the supplemental briefing order and arguments. First, the 
justices issued the supplemental briefing order focused entirely on 
strict scrutiny questions—the Court specifically asked the parties 
to address whether solutions were possible that would allow em-
ployees to receive contraceptives from their existing insurance com-
panies, but without requiring any involvement of petitioners. That 
order would make no sense if the justices actually agreed with the 
“not your plan” argument that had won in almost every circuit court. 
If even four justices had accepted that argument, there would have 
been no need to even consider strict scrutiny at all.46
Furthermore, the government’s supplemental briefs again em-
phasized that the “accommodation” really does use the employer’s 
plan, at least for the most common plan type (that is, self-insured). 
In that context, the government acknowledged “the statutory ob-
ligation to provide contraceptive coverage falls only on the plan,” 
the government can achieve its goals only “in a written plan instru-
ment,” and “[t]here is no mechanism for requiring TPAs to provide sepa-
rate contraceptive coverage without a plan instrument.”47
Ultimately, the government’s Supreme Court concessions about 
how the accommodation works had two important effects. First, they 
eliminated any possibility that the government could win the case 
with the argument that had been so successful in the courts of appeal, 
namely that the “accommodation” was separate and independent 
45  Id. at 61.
46  See Michael McConnell, More from Michael McConnell on Supplemental Brief-
ing in Zubik v. Burwell, Volokh Conspiracy, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 2016, https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/04/13/more-from-michael-
mcconnell-on-the-supplementary-briefing-in-zubik-v-burwell/ (“[W]hy worry about 
alternatives unless the Justices are unpersuaded by the government’s argument that the 
mandate imposed no substantial burden on religious exercise to begin with? . . . Most 
significantly, the order suggests that the Justices are delving into the weeds of regula-
tory detail. I have always thought that the more you get into the regulatory details, the 
weaker the government’s case begins to look. The Administration’s supporters have got-
ten by on sloppy mischaracterizations of the proposed accommodation.”).
47 Supp. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 31, at 16, 17 (emphasis in original).
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from the employer’s plan and therefore did not impose a “substantial 
burden.” Second, they turned the Court’s attention to the question 
of strict scrutiny, which had received scant attention below because 
the lower courts had mostly stopped their analysis upon accepting 
the now-defunct “not your plan” argument. With the focus on strict 
scrutiny, the government made two more important concessions.
Concession 2: Any plan with at least some contraceptives 
will do.
A key to the government’s argument in these cases was always a 
claimed need to include contraceptives in employer-provided health 
insurance. After all, if it were just as good to get a plan from some 
other source—from a family member’s employer, from the new 
exchanges set up under the ACA, or from another government 
program—then there would be little reason for the government to 
insist that women must be able to get contraceptive coverage from 
religious employers. Likewise, if it were sufficient for plans to cover 
some contraceptives but not all, or to offer contraceptives but require 
a co-pay, then the government could hardly insist on religious em-
ployers’ providing a plan with free coverage of all contraceptives.
In the litigation at the Supreme Court, the government eventually 
conceded that its interests can be satisfied so long as women are able 
to obtain at least some contraceptives from an employer-based plan, 
and as long as women who do not have an employer-provided plan 
with contraceptives can get such a plan elsewhere.
First, in defending the ACA’s exemption for “grandfathered” 
plans—which are exempt from the contraceptive mandate entirely, 
and which cover approximately 100 million Americans—the gov-
ernment explained that this gap in coverage does not undermine its 
compelling interest.48 Why? Because most employers already provide 
at least “some contraceptive coverage.”49 Therefore, the government 
told the Court, the grandfathering exception does not undermine 
48  Although the Court had assumed a compelling interest in Hobby Lobby, the jus-
tices were skeptical about the grandfathering exemption which advanced “simply the 
interest of employers in avoiding the inconvenience of amending an existing plan.” 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (noting that Congress apparently did not consider the 
contraceptive mandate to be among the “particularly significant protections” to be 
implemented immediately).
49  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 29, at 64.
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the claimed interest because “most women currently covered under 
grandfathered plans likely have (and will continue to have) some con-
traceptive coverage.”50
But what about women whose employers do not offer any contra-
ceptive coverage—either because they are fully exempt “religious 
employers” or because the employer is small enough that it need 
not offer any coverage at all? The government explained that allow-
ing employers to leave women in this position was also fine. Why? 
Because women who are not offered contraceptive coverage from 
their employer have the option of getting on plans with that coverage 
from many other sources. As the government explained:
If a small employer elects not to provide health coverage (or if 
a large employer chooses to pay the tax rather than providing 
coverage), employees will ordinarily obtain coverage through a 
family member’s employer, through an individual insurance policy 
purchased on an Exchange or directly from an insurer, or through 
Medicaid or another government program. All of those sources 
would include contraceptive coverage.51
It is not surprising that the government believes there are so 
many existing ways to get women free access to contraceptives. Even 
before the government finalized the contraceptive mandate, HHS 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius acknowledged that birth control was 
“the most commonly taken drug in America by young and middle-
aged women” and that “contraceptive services are available at sites 
such as community health centers, public clinics, and hospitals with 
income-based support.”52 And nearly 100 million people do not have 
a health plan covered by the contraceptive mandate53—a gap that 
would be intolerable to the government and supporters of contra-
ceptive access if there were not easy and available ways for those 
women to obtain contraceptives.
50  Id. (emphasis added).
51  Id. at 65 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
52  HHS Press Release, A Statement by U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Jan. 20, 2012).
53  See Understanding Who Is Exempted from the New HHS Mandate, http://
thelittlesistersofthepoor.com/math (last visited June 24, 2016) (“According to the gov-
ernment’s own statistics, almost 100 million Americans don’t have plans that must 
comply with the mandate.”).
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The government’s concessions are devastating to any claim that 
contraceptive coverage must include every single contraceptive, and 
to any claim that contraceptive coverage must come from the em-
ployer. The government thus made it obvious to the Court that as 
long as women have access to a plan with at least some contraceptives 
from some source, the government’s interests are satisfied. There is 
no need for the coverage to come from the employer’s plan, and there 
is no need for the coverage to include every single contraceptive.
Concession 3: The government does not need to force 
religious organizations to execute a particular form or notice 
to know they object.
For several years before Zubik, the government insisted in courts 
across the country that the current version of the contraceptive 
mandate was the least restrictive means of serving the government’s 
goals. The government had originally claimed that forcing religious 
organizations to sign EBSA Form 700 or provide an equivalent no-
tice was “to provide for regularized, orderly means of permitting 
eligible individuals or entities to declare that they intend to take ad-
vantage”54 of the “accommodation.” And the government went so far 
as to mock the Little Sisters of the Poor and other groups for refus-
ing to sign, saying they were “fighting an invisible dragon”55 they 
could vanquish “with a stroke of their own pen.”56 After insisting in 
Wheaton College that the form was the “least restrictive means”57 to 
achieve its goals, the government eventually admitted that it did not 
need the form after all.58 The government made similar concessions 
after Hobby Lobby, where it originally told the government that the 
54  Memo. for Respondents in Opp. at 33, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S. 
Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13A691).
55  Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 1, Little Sisters of the 
Poor v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Colo. 2013) (No. 13-2611).
56  Memo. for Respondents in Opp. at 21, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S. 
Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13A691).
57  Memo. for Respondents in Opp. at 2–3, Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 
2806 (2014) (No. 13A1284).
58  Interim Final Regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 51094 (Aug. 27, 2014) (noting, despite ear-
lier denials, that it was possible to use “an alternative to the EBSA Form 700 method 
of self-certification, and to preserve participants’ and beneficiaries’ . . . access to cover-
age for the full range of FDA-approved contraceptives, as prescribed by a health care 
provider, without cost sharing.”).
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for-profit mandate was the least restrictive means, only to later tell 
the world that another means would work just fine too.59
In its opening brief at the Supreme Court, the government con-
tinued to claim that requiring a form or notice from the religious 
groups was the least restrictive means of satisfying a compelling 
government interest.60 And the government specifically told the 
Court that it could not accept a system in which religious organiza-
tions could avoid executing a form or notice to trigger contraceptive 
coverage.61 But in supplemental briefs to the Court, the government 
finally acknowledged that this was untrue. In fact, the government 
acknowledged (albeit reluctantly) that the existing system actually 
“could be modified to operate” without demanding signatures from 
the religious groups “while still ensuring that the affected women 
receive contraceptive coverage seamlessly, together with the rest of 
their health coverage.”62
As a legal matter, this concession was damning to the govern-
ment’s RFRA argument. Through RFRA, Congress only allows sub-
stantial burdens on religion where the government can demonstrate 
that it is using “the least restrictive means” of advancing its interests. 
If the procedure “could be modified” so as to lessen the religious 
burden, RFRA requires that it must be modified.
The government tried to limit the scope of this concession, sug-
gesting that it only applies to employers with traditional insurance. 
As to employers with self-insured plans, the government said the 
proposal “would not work” because “there is no insurer” who can be 
obligated to provide the coverage.63 And while the government said 
it could proceed without an employer’s signature in the insured con-
text, it said this was impossible in the self-insured context because 
59  Compare Brief for the Petitioners at 14, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (No. 13-354) (mandate is “the least restrictive means” of achieving government 
interests”) with Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 79 Fed. Reg. 51121 (Aug. 27, 2014) 
(noting that government can, in fact, make sure the “same, separate payments for 
contraceptive services” available for employees of nonprofits are “provided to partici-
pants and beneficiaries of group health plans” used by for-profits.)
60  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 29, at 72–89.
61  Id. at 89.
62  Supp. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 31, at 13 (emphasis added).
63  Id. at 16.
Cato Supreme Court Review
142
it would impose an intolerable burden on women to have to obtain 
their contraceptive payments “through an unrelated insurer” rather 
than their existing TPA.64
The problem with the government’s attempted limitation, however, 
was that the government had already allowed for TPAs of self-insured 
plans to pass their obligation off to other parties. Thus, for the more than 
600,000 people on self-insured plans using the “accommodation,”65 it 
was already permissible for the TPA to “arrange for an issuer or other 
entity to provide payments” instead of doing so itself.66 This is presum-
ably why the Supreme Court addressed its supplemental briefing order 
only to whether persons on insured plans could be served through the 
same insurer: there was no need to ask the government about self-in-
sured plans because the government had already answered that ques-
tion in its existing regulations, which already allowed for a different 
entity to provide the coverage in the self-insured context.
C. With Resolution in Sight, the Court Remands
The government’s concessions made what once seemed like an 
intractable conflict suddenly quite resolvable. If, as the government 
now acknowledged, so many other sources exist for plans with con-
traceptives—a family member’s plan, a plan on the exchanges, a plan 
directly from an insurer, or a plan from a government program67—
then it is hard to see why the government needs to force religious 
employers to comply with the mandate.68 Any employee who does 
64  Id. at 8 (“requiring women to obtain most of their health coverage through a TPA 
but their contraceptive coverage through an unrelated insurer would undermine the 
compelling interest in ensuring that women receive full and equal health coverage”).
65  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 29, at 18–19.
66  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A (2)(ii).
67  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 29, at 65.
68  Of course the government regularly touts the benefits of its own exchanges as 
sources of good, affordable, easy-to-access health care. See, e.g., Healthcare.gov, 
“Why bother with health insurance?” https://www.healthcare.gov/young-adults/
ready-to-apply (last visited June 24, 2016) (“Applying can be easy and fast,” is “more 
affordable—and easier—than you might think,” and comes with “complete cover-
age” including “free contraceptive services.”). Indeed, in his 2016 State of the Union 
address, President Barack Obama explained that “filling gaps in employer-based care” 
is “what the Affordable Care Act is all about.” See Remarks of President Obama— 
State of the Union Address as Delivered, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-
delivery-state-union-address.
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not like the plan offered by her employer can simply receive con-
traceptive coverage from these other sources, like tens of millions 
of other Americans already do.69 Likewise, if the government does 
not need to force religious organizations to execute documents and 
notices “to provide for regularized, orderly means” for religious or-
ganizations to be accommodated—as the government had claimed 
earlier—then there is little reason to believe the government could 
pass strict scrutiny for requiring an apparently unnecessary (but 
religiously forbidden) act. Simply put, the government’s concessions 
make clear that there is no need for the courts to have to decide be-
tween contraceptive access and religious liberty—both values can be 
protected at the same time.
For this reason, it should not have been surprising that the Court 
issued a unanimous decision less than a month after the supplemen-
tal briefs were filed. Although the Court said it was not reaching 
the merits, its decision has several important impacts on the con-
traceptive mandate dispute. First, the Court vacated all of the lower 
court opinions on this subject—all but one of which had been in 
favor of the government. Second, the Court ordered that the gov-
ernment could not insist that religious organizations execute docu-
ments to allow the use of their plans to distribute contraceptives. Of 
course the government remains free to facilitate contraceptive cover-
age without using the religious organizations’ health plans. But the 
Court said it had no need for them to sign documents and could not 
fine them for their refusal to sign documents because the govern-
ment already knows they object.
Far from being a “punt” or a “dodge” then, the Court’s decision 
significantly changes the precedents in the lower courts, the rela-
tionships of the parties, and the prospects for a reasonable resolu-
tion of the dispute. The government surely cannot return to the 
lower courts and insist yet again on forcing the religious groups to 
execute documents the Court unanimously found unnecessary. Nor 
can the government insist that its existing “accommodation” is the 
69  President Obama, State of the Union, supra note 68. In fact, contraceptive advocates 
have argued that Title X is actually better than insurance at “helping clients obtain—and 
quickly begin using—a contraceptive method best suited to them” because Title X clin-
ics are “more likely . . . to provide contraceptives on-site, rather than giving women a 
prescription that must be filled at a pharmacy.” See Rachel Benson Gold, Going the Extra 
Mile: The Difference Title X Makes, Guttmacher Policy Rev., Spring 2012, at 13–14.
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least restrictive means of achieving its goals given that it has now 
acknowledged the opposite in briefing. Nor can it deny that contra-
ceptive coverage is “part of the same plan as the coverage provided 
by the employer” now that it has admitted this fact at the Supreme 
Court. Instead, now that the government has acknowledged that 
contraceptive coverage from other sources will suffice, and that it 
does not need to insist on compliance with its current system, it is 
likely that the government will have to follow the Court’s guidance 
and reach a resolution “that accommodates petitioners’ religious ex-
ercise” while at the same time ensuring that women “receive full 
and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.”70
II.  Zubik’s Lesson: How the Government’s Concessions and 
Supreme Court’s Resolution Exposed the Excessive 
Deference of the Lower Courts
The most important story of the Zubik litigation, however, is not the 
sequence of important developments at the Supreme Court. It is the 
absence of such developments in the lower courts.
The kind of judicial scrutiny that forced the government into mak-
ing major concessions at the Supreme Court was unfortunately in 
short supply in the circuit courts, most of which simply accepted 
the government’s claims. That deference caused lower courts to 
embrace—sometimes quite emphatically—positions the government 
would eventually abandon. That deference needlessly prolonged liti-
gation and obscured solutions that should have achieved the goals 
of all parties, namely, expanded contraceptive access (which the gov-
ernment seeks) and protection for religious liberty (which the reli-
gious parties seek).
Consider the central assertion of the government’s substantial bur-
den argument that was so successful in the circuit courts—that the 
contraceptive coverage provided under the “accommodation” was 
not part of the religious employer’s health plan. That assertion never 
made much sense as a matter of plain English—by definition, the 
“plan administrator” the government required to provide the drugs 
is surely someone who is administering the plan. And the government’s 
position never made sense as a matter of ERISA law, either, which 
makes clear that only the employer can amend a plan or appoint a 
70  Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560.
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plan administrator.71 Nor did it square with common sense: if the 
coverage actually were separate, why would the government need 
signed authorization documents from the religious organization to 
provide it? This is presumably why, when the litigation reached the 
Supreme Court, the government lost its nerve and admitted the obvi-
ous: the coverage is “part of the same plan as the coverage provided by 
the employer” and that “[t]here is no mechanism for requiring TPAs to 
provide separate contraceptive coverage without a plan instrument.”72
But in the courts of appeals, the government agencies told a much 
different story for as long as they could get away with it. For example, 
the government insisted to those courts that religious organizations 
“need not place contraceptive coverage into the basket of goods and 
services that constitute their healthcare plans.”73 The government told 
those courts that the coverage was not part of the plan but was “sepa-
rate coverage through third parties” that resulted from an “indepen-
dent” obligation created by “federal law” and not triggered by “the 
religious organization’s signing and mailing” new plan documents.74
Rather than explain and defend the details of how the “accommo-
dation” worked, the government often retreated behind the observa-
tion that ERISA law is complicated. For example, in the D.C. Circuit, 
the government protested that “if I say more than a couple of lines 
about ERISA I’m going to like sort of find myself in quicksand.” When 
Judge Nina Pillard asked a follow-up question about whether there 
is anything in ERISA that requires the employer to be the one to des-
ignate a plan administrator, the government responded “The short 
71  See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (plan must be “established or maintained by an employer 
or employee organization”); 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (plan must be “established and 
maintained pursuant to a written plan instrument”); 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (16)(A)(i) (plan 
administrator is either the employer or “the person so designated by the terms of the 
instrument under which the plan is operated”; government can designate only where 
“an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor cannot be found”); Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) “Employers or other plan spon-
sors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or 
terminate welfare plans.”
72  Supp. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 31, at 16–17.
73  Brief for the Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 25, Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of 
HHS, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5368).
74  Brief for the Appellants at 2, 22, 33, E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 
(5th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-20112).
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answer is I don’t know.”75 In other circuits, the government retreated 
behind the complexity of ERISA, citing “the metaphysics of ERISA.”76 
Remarkably, these courts knew enough to understand that ERISA 
mattered to the outcome—one judge mused from the bench, “So it 
sounds like this is all an ERISA issue”77—but they ultimately con-
tented themselves deferring to the representations of government 
lawyers who themselves protested to be overmatched by ERISA.
The government was enormously successful with this approach. 
Every court of appeals to find for the government embraced its the-
ory that contraceptive coverage was not part of the employer’s plan 
as a key part of its substantial burden holding. The Fifth Circuit, for 
example, based its ruling on the notion that contraceptive coverage is 
provided “separately from the plans.”78 The Sixth Circuit found that 
“the eligible organization’s health plan does not host the coverage.”79
The extent of the lower courts’ deference to the government on this 
point is perhaps best illustrated by the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
the Wheaton College case. The Wheaton decision was authored by Judge 
Richard Posner, whose early opinions in the Notre Dame case were 
widely cited by other circuits. In ruling for the government, Judge Posner 
firmly embraced the government’s (soon-to-be-abandoned) claim that it 
was not using the religious organization’s plan at all. For example, the 
court explained that it was “inaccurate” to claim that the government 
wanted “to use Wheaton College’s health plans to distribute emergency 
contraceptive drugs.”80 The court emphasized the point repeatedly:
•	 “Actually there are no efforts by the government to take over 
Wheaton’s health plans, as Wheaton contends.”81
•	 “So when Wheaton College tells us that it is being ‘forced’ to 
allow ‘use’ of its health plans to cover emergency contracep-
tives, it is wrong.”82
75  Transcript of Oral Arg. at 40–42, Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, 772 F.3d 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13–5368).
76  Arg. audio at 25:10–22, Wheaton College v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2015).
77  Id. at 12:15–18.
78  E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 461 (5th Cir. 2015).
79  Mich. Cath. Conf. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 751 (6th Cir. 2015).
80  Wheaton College v. Burwell, 791 F.3d at 793 (7th Cir. 2015).
81  Id. at 794.
82  Id. at 795.
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•	 “Call this ‘using’ the health plans? We call it refusing to use 
the health plans.”83
•	 “The upshot is that the college contracts with health insur-
ers for contraceptive coverage exclusive of coverage for 
emergency contraceptives, and the Department of Health 
and Human Services contracts with those insurers to cover 
emergency-contraceptive benefits. The latter contracts are not 
part of the college’s health plans, and so the college is mis-
taken when it tells us that the government is ‘interfering’ with 
the college’s contracts with its insurers. The contracts, which 
do not require coverage of emergency contraception, are un-
changed. New contracts are created, to which the college is 
not a party, between the government and the insurers.”84
•	 “Almost the entire weight of its case falls on attempting to 
show that the government is trying to ‘use’ the college’s 
health plans, and it is this alleged use that it primarily asks us 
to enjoin. But the government isn’t using the college’s health 
plans, as we have explained at perhaps excessive length.”85
Other courts made similar errors.86
We now know that these courts had it exactly wrong. As the gov-
ernment admitted to the Supreme Court, it was trying to use the re-
ligious organizations’ health plans, and it knew that the only way 
to do so was to issue “plan instruments” on those plans. Had the 
government been as forthcoming to the circuit courts as it was to the 
Supreme Court—or if lower courts had pressured the government 
to explain its accommodation in more detail—these mistakes would 
likely have been avoided and the government’s substantial burden 
argument would have collapsed much sooner. But unfortunately the 
government’s brazen-but-wrong assertions, combined with some ju-
dicial reluctance to delve into the mechanics of ERISA and the rel-
evant regulations, was enough to fool many courts of appeal.
83  Id. at 796.
84  Id.
85  Id. at 801.
86  Compare, e.g., Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 778 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The sub-
mission of the form has no real effect on the plan participants and beneficiaries.”) 
with Supp. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 31, at 16–17, (“There is no mecha-
nism for requiring TPAs to provide separate contraceptive coverage without a plan 
instrument.”).
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The government’s success with the “not your plan” argument in 
the circuit courts had an important side effect: the courts almost all 
focused on substantial burden, leaving the strict scrutiny arguments 
relatively underdeveloped. Thus, while the Eighth Circuit reached 
the strict scrutiny arguments and decided against the government, 
no other court ruled on strict scrutiny grounds, and just three cir-
cuits addressed strict scrutiny in the alternative. The failure of most 
circuit courts to even get to strict scrutiny explains why the Supreme 
Court seemed to be breaking new ground when it focused the sup-
plemental briefing on available alternatives.
And while strict scrutiny did not receive as much focus in the cir-
cuit courts, those courts that ruled in the government’s favor were 
again misled into adopting positions the government would soon 
abandon. For example, the government succeeded in convincing 
lower courts that it had a compelling need to use employer-provided 
plans because that was the best way to provide access to contra-
ceptives. As the D.C. Circuit explained, the government sought to 
“build[] on the market-based system of employer-sponsored pri-
vate health insurance already in place. The contraceptive coverage 
requirement and accommodation operate through that system.”87 
Thus, the D.C. Circuit found that “[i]mposing even minor added 
steps would dissuade women from obtaining contraceptives and de-
feat the compelling interests in enhancing access to such coverage.”88 
A Seventh Circuit panel declared that it would be “a bother for a 
person to shop for the ‘best’ contraceptive coverage” such that solu-
tions other than employer-provided contraceptives “would reduce 
the number of women with such coverage.”89 The Eleventh Circuit 
likewise found that alternatives outside of employer-provided con-
traceptives “impose burdens on women that would make contracep-
tives less available.”90
Not even the government actually believes those things. For 
example, consider the government’s forthright acknowledgement 
87  Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
88  Id.
89  Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 616–17 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016).
90  Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of HHS, 818 F.3d 1122, 
1158 (11th Cir. 2016).
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to the Supreme Court that women who do not get contraceptives 
from their employer have many alternative ways to obtain them—
“a family member’s employer,” “on an Exchange,” “directly from an 
insurer,” “or through Medicaid or another government program”—
and therefore do not undermine the government’s interests.91 The 
government needed to make this concession at the Supreme Court 
because it needed to explain why exemptions covering nearly 100 
million Americans did not threaten its allegedly compelling inter-
est.92 The government likewise admitted that even its existing system 
“could be modified” to eliminate the need for religious organizations 
to execute documents that violate their faith.
Again, had the government been forced to make these statements 
in the lower courts, it would have been clear much earlier that it was 
possible to find alternative solutions “that accommodate[] petition-
ers’ religious exercise” and also ensure that women “receive full and 
equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.”93 Those 
alternatives may include those identified by the government (getting 
another plan from a family member’s employer, on an exchange, or 
through a government program).94 Or the alternative could be one of 
the ways suggested by the petitioners in their supplemental brief (sep-
arate contraceptive-only plans, like the dental plans available on the 
exchanges; direct provision by doctors or pharmacists who already 
need to be involved in the process; existing government programs; or, 
“Like activating a credit card, it could be as simple as having the in-
surance company send each eligible employee a contraceptive cover-
age card with a sticker attached providing a telephone number to call 
or website portal to use should she wish to activate the coverage.”).95
But whatever the final resolution of the dispute looks like, it is 
clear that the path of deference followed in the lower courts allowed 
the government to survive for years without acknowledging impor-
tant facts about its system and its alternatives. A mutually acceptable 
91  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 29, at 65.
92  The justices had expressed skepticism about the government’s compelling inter-
est arguments in Hobby Lobby in part based on the existence of large exceptions. 134 
S. Ct. at 2780.
93  Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560.
94  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 29, at 65.
95  Supp. Brief of Petitioners at 10, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 14-1418).
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resolution only became plausible when deference gave way to scru-
tiny. Partisans on all sides should lament the fact that the government 
took so long to make its admissions—earlier concessions about the 
availability of win-win resolutions would have resulted in greater 
access to contraceptives and more religious liberty.
III.  Conclusion: The Supreme Court’s Handling of Zubik as 
a Model
It may seem strange to suggest that such an unusual and compli-
cated process at the Supreme Court should be a model for future 
religious-liberty cases. But the oddities and complexities of the case 
actually offer us a useful case study. When courts receive government 
arguments with deference, governments will often have no shortage 
of excuses for why they cannot accommodate religious liberty or 
some other civil right. And the government’s litigators will have no 
incentive to plainly acknowledge inconvenient truths about the chal-
lenged activities. That approach will bring us more litigation, more 
discord, and will undermine both civil liberties and the credibility of 
the courts. But when courts apply the healthy skepticism required by 
RFRA and other federal civil-rights laws, it turns out that even seem-
ingly intractable disputes can be resolved on terms that protect the 
interests on all sides. Had the courts of appeals applied the same level 
of skepticism to the government’s arguments that the Supreme Court 
did, those solutions—ones that both provide contraceptive access and 
protect religious liberty—might have been in place years earlier. In-
stead, excessive deference led to more litigation and division.
It is worth noting that RFRA does not require that religious parties 
always win. It was designed instead to require strict judicial scru-
tiny of government arguments in order to find “sensible balances,” 
on a case-by-case basis, between government interests and private 
religious interests. Those sensible balances were elusive in the lower 
courts, because the government was allowed to succeed with super-
ficial arguments it would later abandon. Sensible balancing only be-
came possible when the Supreme Court greeted the government’s 
arguments with a healthy skepticism rather than blind faith. In this 
respect, Zubik did not “punt” or “dodge” the key issues at all—it en-
gaged them and pushed them toward resolution, while giving the 
lower courts an important lesson about the dangers of judicial defer-
ence to the government.
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All of this makes continued litigation in Zubik unlikely. In fact, 
rather than continuing to make its case to the lower courts, the gov-
ernment’s first move after remand was to issue a “request for in-
formation” in the Federal Register. Instead of trying to defeat the 
plaintiffs’ RFRA claims in court, the government now says it wants 
information about how it can “resolve” those claims administratively. 
Tellingly, the government says it is interested in pursuing its goals in 
“alternative ways (other than those offered in current regulations).”96
That focus on alternatives makes sense. The government’s best chance 
of achieving its stated goal of expanding contraceptive access is to adopt 
a new approach. An alternative to the current regulations that does not 
rely on religious organizations and their health plans would be able to 
take effect sooner and without the cloud of litigation that has engulfed 
the current regulations. Better yet (from the government’s perspective) 
an approach that does not rely on the employer’s health plan would 
provide the same access to everyone who wants it, regardless of what 
kind of plan their employer provides, and regardless of the employer’s 
reason for lacking contraceptive coverage.97 Indeed, advocates of con-
traceptive access should welcome this opportunity to disentangle such 
access from an employer’s religious beliefs and insurance decisions.98
Of course the government could instead choose to continue litigat-
ing in defense of the current mandate. But it is hard to believe that 
option is appealing. For while the Zubik opinion does not purport to 
control the RFRA analysis going forward, the same cannot be said 
for the government’s concessions about its regulations and its alter-
natives. Those concessions—that the mandate actually does use re-
ligious organizations’ health plans and that there are other ways to 
achieve the government’s goals that are less restrictive of religious 
liberty—leave the government’s RFRA case in tatters. And those 
concessions also mean that lower-court judges who now know the 
government fooled them once on the way up to the Supreme Court 
are unlikely to be quite so trusting on the way back down.
96  All citations in this paragraph to Coverage for Contraceptive Services, 81 
Fed. Reg. 47,741 (July 22, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/ 
07/22/2016-17242/coverage-for-contraceptive-services.
97  See Supp. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 31, at 20.
98  See Miriam Berg, “Hey Boss, Get Out of My Bedroom,” Says New Bill in Senate, 
Planned Parenthood Action Fund, July 15, 2014, https://www.plannedparenthood 
action.org/blog/hey-boss-get-out-my-bedroom-says-new-bill-senate.
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The Court’s unorthodox approach in Zubik thus makes an admin-
istrative resolution more likely and continued litigation less likely (or 
at least less difficult, given what the government has now conceded). 
In the process, the Court erased errant precedents in many circuits, 
protected the religious groups from fines, and produced a clarity on 
the key issues that had evaded most lower courts. For a Court that 
was shorthanded and once thought to be deadlocked on a hot-button 
case, these are significant accomplishments.
